WT Hardening

By Webmasters.Team

20+ active installationsVersion 1.1.3

WordPress hardening without touching your theme: XML-RPC, user enumeration, login limiter, security headers, strong passwords, event log.

Description

WT Hardening is a lightweight, modular security plugin that turns on the most important WordPress hardening measures without modifying your theme, wp-config.php, or .htaccess. Everything works through WordPress hooks and can be disabled at any moment with a single click.

The plugin is completely free, without a PRO version, without ads, and without sending data to external servers. Built by the Webmasters.Team crew for daily WordPress work.

Modules

  • XML-RPC: blocks xmlrpc.php (403) and filters the XML-RPC methods. Stops brute-force attacks through the most attacked WordPress endpoint.
  • User enumeration: hides logins by blocking /wp/v2/users in the REST API for unauthenticated users.
  • Author archive: redirects /?author=1 and author archive URLs to the homepage for visitors who are not logged in, and removes the users sitemap (another enumeration vector).
  • Hide oEmbed author: strips author_name and author_url from oEmbed responses (WPScan-detectable user-enumeration vector) and drops the oEmbed discovery <link> tags from <head>.
  • Hide WP version: removes the <meta name="generator"> tag and redundant meta tags (wlwmanifest, rsd, shortlink), and replaces the ?ver= values of front-end assets with a short keyed hash: the versions are not revealed, but the value still changes after every update, so browsers and caches load the new files.
  • X-Pingback: removes the X-Pingback HTTP header from all responses.
  • Login errors: replaces the specific “wrong login / wrong password” messages with a single generic text (does not reveal whether a login exists) on wp-login.php, the WooCommerce login form, REST API application passwords (HTTP Basic auth) and XML-RPC.
  • Login limiter: blocks an IP (for IPv6, its /64 network) for X minutes after N failed attempts on wp-login.php, the WooCommerce login form, XML-RPC and REST API application passwords. Repeated lockouts within 24 hours escalate to a long lockout (default: 4th lockout = 24 hours). Shows the number of attempts left, an IP/CIDR allowlist, Cloudflare / reverse-proxy support, one-click unlock in the log and optional email alerts. Data lives in dedicated tables (not wp_options), with hourly cleanup of old entries.
  • File editor: sets DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT, hiding the theme and plugin editor in the admin (an attacker who compromises an account cannot inject a backdoor through the browser).
  • Password policy: enforces minimum length and complexity (upper and lower case, digits, optionally symbols) for profile updates, registration, password reset and the REST API users endpoints.
  • Security HTTP headers: X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, optionally HSTS (use with care because browsers cache it for a year) with a separate opt-in for includeSubDomains. HSTS is also sent when HTTPS ends at Cloudflare or at a trusted reverse proxy (X-Forwarded-Proto).
  • Event log: records logins (successful and failed), registrations, user changes, plugin activations and deactivations, theme switches, and settings updates. Retention defaults to 30 days. Visible in the admin panel.

What makes it different

  • Modular architecture: each module is a separate class and can be disabled in the settings without affecting the others.
  • Zero external dependencies: no Composer, no vendor lock-in, no cloud APIs.
  • No data leaves the instance: everything stays in the local MySQL/MariaDB database. The only outgoing request is a weekly download of Cloudflare’s public IP range lists (see External services), which sends nothing about your site or visitors.
  • Internationalization ready: full coverage with __()/esc_html__(), a POT file for translators and a bundled Polish translation.
  • Clean uninstall: when the plugin is removed, options, tables, and cron jobs are dropped.

What WT Hardening does NOT do (by design)

  • Does not scan for malware. That is a different problem and a different toolset.
  • Does not ship telemetry to the cloud. All data is local.
  • Does not add a WAF at the application layer. That belongs to the server or CDN.

For those needs we recommend dedicated plugins (e.g. Wordfence) or an infrastructure layer (Cloudflare, fail2ban).

External services

This plugin connects to one external service: Cloudflare’s published IP range lists. It needs them to recognise requests that come through Cloudflare, so that the login limiter and the event log use the visitor address from the CF-Connecting-IP header only for genuine Cloudflare traffic (and HSTS is sent when HTTPS ends at Cloudflare).

  • What is requested: two plain-text files, https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4 and https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v6.
  • When: once a week, by a WP-Cron event (wt_hardening_cloudflare_ranges), and not on visitor requests.
  • What is sent: nothing beyond a normal HTTP GET request from your server (its IP address and a WT-Hardening/<version> user agent). No cookies, no site address, no visitor or user data.
  • The downloaded lists are used only if every line is a valid IP range; otherwise the previous list (or the copy bundled with the plugin) is kept. Developers can turn the update off with the wt_hardening_update_cloudflare_ranges filter (return false); the bundled list is then used.
  • The service is provided by Cloudflare, Inc.: Website Terms of Use, Privacy Policy.

Installation

Standard install

  1. In the WP admin go to Plugins → Add new.
  2. Search for “WT Hardening”.
  3. Click Install and then Activate.
  4. Open the WT Hardening menu in the admin (shield icon) and configure the modules.

Manual install (via ZIP)

  1. Download the archive from wordpress.org/plugins/wt-hardening.
  2. In the WP admin go to Plugins → Add new → Upload plugin.
  3. Pick the downloaded ZIP, click Install now, and then Activate plugin.

FTP/SFTP install

  1. Unzip the archive.
  2. Upload the wt-hardening folder to wp-content/plugins/ on your server.
  3. In the WP admin go to Plugins → Installed plugins and activate WT Hardening.

After activation all modules are enabled with sensible defaults. If something clashes with your workflow (for example the Jetpack mobile app that needs XML-RPC), just turn off the specific module in the settings.

FAQ

Does the plugin modify wp-config.php or .htaccess?

No. Everything is wired through WordPress hooks. Deactivating the plugin instantly reverts all changes (except HSTS, which browsers cache, so enabling HSTS is a conscious decision).

Will blocking XML-RPC break my mobile app / Jetpack / pingbacks?

Possibly, if you actually rely on them. Disable the XML-RPC module in the settings. The other protection layers stay active.

What happens to the event log on deactivation?

The table stays in the database (useful for later analysis). On full uninstall the tables are dropped cleanly.

Does the plugin work with multisite?

Tested on a single-site install. Settings, tables and cleanup jobs are per site; tables are created on each site the first time the plugin runs there, and uninstalling removes the data from every site of the network. Multisite is not yet formally supported, so file an issue if something breaks.

I locked myself out. What now?

Wait until the lockout expires, log in from another network (e.g. your phone’s mobile data), or ask another administrator to click Unlock under Webmasters.Team → WT Hardening → Login log tab. With WP-CLI access you can remove the lockout directly: wp db query "DELETE FROM wp_wt_hardening_lockouts WHERE ip='1.2.3.4'" (adjust the table prefix; for IPv6 use the /64 network shown in the log, e.g. 2001:db8:1:2::/64). Add your office IP to the allowlist to avoid this in the future.

My site is behind Cloudflare. What should I set?

Nothing. Since 1.1.1 Cloudflare is recognised automatically. When a request comes from Cloudflare’s published IP ranges (updated weekly from cloudflare.com, with a bundled copy as fallback), the visitor address is taken from the CF-Connecting-IP header, also with Site behind Cloudflare / proxy left at No. The header is ignored for requests from any other address, so it cannot be spoofed by hitting your server directly. Choosing Cloudflare explicitly works the same way. Without this every visitor would appear with a Cloudflare IP, so one attacker could lock everyone out.

My site is behind another reverse proxy (nginx, a load balancer). What should I set?

Set Site behind Cloudflare / proxy to Reverse proxy on the local network. X-Forwarded-For is then trusted only from private-network addresses. When the plugin sees such a proxy while the setting is still No, it shows a notice on its admin pages.

What about performance?

Modules only register the hooks they actually need. The event log is a single INSERT per event. No scanner, no background work beyond an hourly and daily cleanup of old rows. Real impact on response time: under 1 ms.

Why is HSTS disabled by default?

Because Strict-Transport-Security has a sticky effect (browsers remember the header for a year). Enabling it too early (before your entire traffic works on HTTPS without errors) can lock users out of the site for a long time. Turn it on once HTTPS is rock-solid. includeSubDomains is a separate setting (off by default) because it also forces HTTPS on every subdomain; preload is never added.

HSTS is on, but the header is missing behind my proxy. Why?

The header is sent only over HTTPS. When HTTPS ends at a proxy, WordPress sees plain HTTP and the plugin relies on the X-Forwarded-Proto: https header, but only from a proxy it trusts: Cloudflare’s IP ranges (always) or, with Site behind Cloudflare / proxy set to Reverse proxy on the local network, a private-network address. From any other address the header is ignored, so it cannot be spoofed.

Does the strong password policy apply to users created through WP-CLI or `wp_create_user()`?

No. The policy hooks into form validation (profile, registration, reset) and the REST API users endpoints. Programmatic user creation bypasses these hooks by design. For a typical client workflow (users are created through the admin panel) this is enough.

What personal data does the plugin store?

The login limiter stores the IP address and the login typed in failed attempts (kept for the configured counter window, at most 7 days) and in lockouts (kept until 24 hours after they end). The event log stores the user, IP address and event details, including logins typed in failed attempts and the email of new users (kept for the configured retention, 30 days by default). Everything stays in your database. The data is included in Tools → Export Personal Data, and Tools → Erase Personal Data deletes the person’s event log entries and removes their login from attempts and lockouts. The attempt and lockout records themselves, with their IP addresses, are kept until they expire (a security log); the erase tool reports them as retained and explains why. Mention the login security log in your privacy policy: the plugin adds suggested text with the current retention periods to Settings → Privacy → Policy guide.

Screenshots

Changelog

1.1.3

  • Translations: the Polish translation follows the WordPress Polish team glossary (for example “Dziennik zdarzeń” and “Dziennik logowania” instead of “Log …”, “email” instead of “e-mail”, “witryna” instead of “strona” for the site).

1.1.2

  • New: WT Hardening now lives in the shared Webmasters.Team menu, with Settings, Login log and Event log as tabs of one page and a new About tab (version, links, changelog). The Webmasters.Team menu also lists our other plugins. Old page addresses redirect to the new tabs.
  • Tweak: clearer wording and consistent typography (curly quotes, no dashes in sentences) in the plugin texts and this readme.

1.1.1

  • Fix: the event log shows true/false for yes/no details (for example network on plugin activation) instead of an empty value.
  • Security: REST API logins with application passwords are now limited. Failed HTTP Basic auth attempts against the REST API were never counted, so passwords could be guessed there without limit. They now count towards the login limiter and lock the IP like wp-login.php failures. While an IP is locked out, the application password is not checked at all and REST requests get a 403 lockout error, even with the correct password. Sites behind server-level Basic auth can turn this off with the wt_hardening_limit_application_passwords filter.
  • Security: IPv6 clients are locked out per /64 network instead of per single address, so switching addresses within one network no longer bypasses the lockout. IPv4 is unchanged. Developers: for IPv6 the wt_hardening_lockout action now receives the network (e.g. 2001:db8:1:2::/64).
  • New: the plugin interface is in English and ships with a Polish translation (used when the site language is Polish; language packs from translate.wordpress.org take precedence).
  • Security: /?author=1 no longer reveals the login. WordPress redirected it to /author/<login>/ before the author archive module ran; the module now redirects first. Author URLs of logins that do not exist are redirected the same way (a 301 vs 404 difference revealed which logins exist), and the users sitemap is removed while the module is on.
  • Security: the password policy now also applies to the REST API (/wp/v2/users, /wp/v2/users/me), which previously accepted any password.
  • Security: the “Login errors” module now also covers the REST API and XML-RPC. Failed application password (HTTP Basic auth) logins return the same invalid_credentials error (401) for an unknown username, an unknown email and a wrong password, and XML-RPC returns the same fault for both. Failed attempts are still counted by the login limiter.
  • HSTS: includeSubDomains is now a separate setting (HSTS: include subdomains). Sites that already had HSTS enabled keep sending it after the update; new installations start with it off, because it forces HTTPS on every subdomain. preload is never added.
  • HSTS is now also sent when HTTPS ends at a TLS-terminating proxy: Cloudflare (recognised by its IP ranges) or the reverse proxy configured in “Site behind Cloudflare / proxy”, which pass X-Forwarded-Proto: https. The header is ignored from other addresses, also in the default mode.
  • Fix: sites behind Cloudflare no longer share a few IP addresses in the login limiter. With the default “Site behind Cloudflare / proxy” = No, all visitors were seen with Cloudflare’s edge addresses, so one attacker could lock everyone out. Requests from Cloudflare’s published IP ranges (bundled list, IPv4 and IPv6) now use the visitor address from CF-Connecting-IP in this mode too; the header is ignored for requests from any other address. The Cloudflare and Reverse proxy modes work as before.
  • New: Cloudflare’s IP ranges are refreshed weekly from cloudflare.com (WP-Cron, two plain-text files, nothing about the site or its visitors is sent; see External services). A list is accepted only if every line is a valid range; otherwise the previous list, or the copy bundled with the plugin, stays in use. Opt out with the wt_hardening_update_cloudflare_ranges filter.
  • New: the plugin’s admin pages show a dismissible notice when requests come through a reverse proxy on the local network (X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP) while “Site behind Cloudflare / proxy” is set to No.
  • Security: client IP detection normalises IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:203.0.113.5). On servers that report clients this way, the “reverse proxy” mode treated every visitor as a local proxy and trusted a spoofed X-Forwarded-For, which allowed bypassing the login limiter.
  • Fix: database tables are now created and updated when the plugin is updated, not only on activation, including the event log table and every site of a multisite network.
  • Fix: uninstall removes the data from every site of a multisite network; deactivation and uninstall remove all scheduled cleanup jobs.
  • Fix: event log retention is applied even while the event log is disabled.
  • Fix: “Hide WP version” no longer strips ?ver= in wp-admin, so the block editor does not load stale cached files after updates.
  • Fix: “Hide WP version” no longer removes ?ver= from front-end assets, which kept visitors on stale cached CSS/JS after updates. The value is now replaced with a 10-character hash keyed with the site’s secret salts: it does not reveal the WordPress, plugin or theme version, but changes whenever the asset version changes.
  • New: the event log, failed attempts and lockouts are included in the WordPress personal data export and erase tools.
  • Privacy: Tools → Erase Personal Data now reports the failed attempt and lockout records it keeps (with their IP addresses, without the username) as retained, with a message explaining that they are a security log deleted automatically. The plugin adds suggested privacy policy text (Settings → Privacy → Policy guide) describing the stored IP addresses, usernames tried, the event log and the retention periods.
  • Developers: internal classes renamed (PHP namespace Webmasters\Security to WebmastersTeam\Hardening); old names kept as aliases for this release. Option, table, hook and cron names are unchanged.
  • Minor: escaping and markup fixes in the admin pages, “Tested up to” removed from the plugin header.
  • New: on PHP older than 8.2 administrators see a notice (Dashboard, Plugins screen and the plugin’s own pages, dismissible for 30 days) and a Site Health recommendation: version 1.2.0 will require PHP 8.2. No external requests are made for this.

1.1.0

  • Security: logging in to your own account no longer resets the attempt counter for the whole IP. Previously a successful login cleared all failed attempts from that IP, so on sites with open registration (e.g. WooCommerce) an attacker could log in to their own account every few tries and keep guessing the administrator’s password indefinitely. Now only the attempts for the account that logged in are cleared.
  • Security: while an IP is locked out, the password is no longer checked at all (no expensive hashing for the attacker, no “correct password” oracle) and the attempts are no longer stored, so an ongoing attack does not flood the database or the event log.
  • Fix: the lockout message is now actually shown. The “Login errors” module replaced it with the generic “invalid credentials” text, so locked-out users never learned they were locked out. The message now also shows the real remaining time.
  • New: escalating lockouts. After N lockouts within 24 hours the IP is locked for a longer time (defaults: 4th lockout = 24 hours, configurable, 0 disables).
  • New: the attempt counter resets after a configurable number of hours (default 24) and starts from zero after each lockout.
  • New: “Attempts left” message under the login error (wp-login.php and WooCommerce).
  • New: allowlist of IP addresses and CIDR ranges (IPv4 and IPv6) that are never locked out.
  • New: “Site behind Cloudflare / proxy” setting. Cloudflare mode trusts CF-Connecting-IP only from Cloudflare’s IP ranges, proxy mode trusts X-Forwarded-For only from private-network proxies. Replaces the need for the wt_hardening_trust_proxy_headers filter (still supported).
  • New: one-click Unlock in the login log (also resets the escalation history for that IP), plus lockout type, last username and lockout end time.
  • New: optional email alert to the administrator on lockouts (all or long only), at most one email per hour.
  • New: lockouts and unlocks are recorded in the event log. Developers: wt_hardening_lockout and wt_hardening_unlocked actions.

1.0.7

  • Compatibility: tested up to WordPress 7.1.

1.0.6

  • Security: hardened client-IP detection in the login limiter and event log. Both modules previously trusted the X-Forwarded-For, CF-Connecting-IP and X-Real-IP request headers unconditionally. On any site that is not behind a trusted reverse proxy those headers are attacker-controlled, which allowed the brute-force protection to be bypassed (rotate the header and every attempt is counted as a fresh IP), allowed an attacker to lock out a chosen account, and allowed the IP stored in the security event log to be forged. The client IP is now read from REMOTE_ADDR by default; proxy headers are honoured only when you opt in via the new wt_hardening_trust_proxy_headers filter (return true when WordPress runs behind Cloudflare, nginx or a load balancer that sets those headers).
  • Fix: minimum password length is now measured in characters (mb_strlen) rather than bytes, so multibyte passwords are validated correctly against the policy.
  • Fix: the event-log cleanup cron event is now also unscheduled on deactivation (previously only the login-limiter cron was cleared).

1.0.5

  • New module: Hide oEmbed author removes author_name and author_url from oEmbed JSON responses (a low-effort user-enumeration vector automatically picked up by WPScan) and drops the oEmbed discovery <link> tags from <head> to reduce the public surface. Enabled by default.

1.0.4

  • Polish: refined the wording of the “Hide WordPress version” module card on the Settings screen for clarity.

1.0.3

  • Compatibility: tested and confirmed working with WordPress 7.0 (new “Modern” admin theme, iframed editor, PHP 7.4+ baseline). “Tested up to” bumped to 7.0. No code or behavior changes.

1.0.2

  • Fix: Plugin URI now points to a public landing page on Webmasters.Team (the previous URL returned 404 during review).

1.0.1

  • Fix: readme rewritten in English to satisfy the WordPress.org July 2025 policy.
  • Fix: escape output in the event log admin page (EventsPage).
  • Fix: replace parse_url() with wp_parse_url() in the XML-RPC module.
  • Fix: prefix global variables in uninstall.php and add safe-query annotations.

1.0.0

First release.

  • XML-RPC module (endpoint block plus methods filter).
  • User enumeration blocker for the REST API.
  • Author archive redirect.
  • Hide WordPress version.
  • Remove X-Pingback header.
  • Generic login error message.
  • Login attempt limiter with IP lockout.
  • File editor disable.
  • Strong password policy (length, mixed case, digits, symbols).
  • Security HTTP headers (X-Frame, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, HSTS).
  • Event log (logins, users, plugins, theme, settings) with configurable retention.